That's when the prisoner issue was cemented as a major part of talks. The roots of this failure go back to the very beginning of the peace negotiations, in July 2013.
These major disagreements are connected by two underlying threads: there was insufficient will on the Israeli side to make a deal and, on the Palestinian side, there simply wasn't enough trust in the process. Finally, the Palestinian Authority formed an interim consensus government with Hamas, which led Israel to finally quit the talks. Second, the Kerry team couldn't sell either side on a "framework agreement" - a general agreement on principles that would precede a detailed, final deal. First, Palestinians and Israelis couldn't agree on which Palestinian prisoners needed to be released from jail, as part of a deal to sustain talks. Regardless of who you blame for the talks's failure, there were three clear interrelated reasons why the talks failed. In his view, it's all the Israelis' - and the Americans' - fault." "The thing that really drove nuts," Ashrawi relates, "is that they blamed him for the talks' collapse. The Palestinians were left waiting for a deal that never came as Israel continued building the settlements that the Americans had promised they could stop or slow. Instead, he detailed a narrative that previously had not been widely reported of how he says the peace talks really ended: one in which the US promised to deliver a plan for peace but reneged. When Abbas recounted his version of how peace talks combusted last spring, he did more than just reiterate the usual Palestinian complaints about the Israelis and Americans. John Kerry, with former Israeli Justice Minister Tzipi Livni (L) and Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat. Why the Palestinians say peace talks really collapsed If they are, then the recent Palestinian moves in the United Nations and the International Criminal Court are harbingers of the future of Palestinian foreign policy - with potentially profound implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Statements made by Abbas and other Palestinian officials this fall, however, suggest that the Palestinian leadership, having lost all faith in the Americans, is seriously committed to this new, international strategy. But it looked to many like the Palestinians were bluffing, or only hedging - trying to bring more pressure to direct peace talks, not sidestep them. The Palestinians had already begun moving away from the old model of talking directly with the Americans and Israelis and towards a campaign to isolate and pressure Israel internationally. The US-led negotiations of 2014, known as the Kerry talks, were in part a last-ditch effort to keep that process alive. For over 20 years since the historic 1993 Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians, there's been one dominant strategy on all sides for achieving peace in the Holy Land: direct, American-mediated talks between the two sides. The new Palestinian approach is a sharp break with the past.
Long-simmering Palestinian frustration with America, which Palestinians have always seen as hopelessly biased towards Israel, has finally bubbled over.
The senior Palestinian leadership has come to believe that the United States is utterly incapable of budging Israel in negotiations and thus of bringing peace. But what was in many ways more important than the details of his story was the attitude it conveyed toward the US: a total collapse in trust. Abbas told a story about Secretary of State John Kerry's failed peace talks that differed greatly from what other participants have said publicly.
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